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MAKING THE CASE FOR ABOLITION: WHY LEGISLATION
RESTRICTING SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IS NOT ENOUGH
Veronica Chmiel
I. INTRODUCTION
An area the size of a parking spot. Nearly twenty-four hours spent
alone, day after day. No one calls or visits. There are no magazines or
books to read; there is no television to watch. For the lucky ones, a small
window allows a few rays of natural light to sneak in. These are just a
few of the conditions of solitary confinement experienced by thousands
of prisoners in the United States. They often do not know how long their
sentence will last—sometimes a few days, sometimes a few years. Some
do not even know the reasons why they were put there in the first place.
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the United
States sparsely used solitary confinement, and by 1890, the Supreme
Court was already commenting on the negative effects of the practice.1
While this inspired a period of harsh criticism of solitary confinement
and expansion of inmates’ access to the courts, the Supreme Court
declined to declare the practice per se unconstitutional.2 The dawn of
the “new age” of solitary confinement, defined by harsher conditions
and more frequent use, is often tied to an incident at Illinois’ Marion
State Penitentiary, where two inmates violently murdered two guards
in separate instances on the same day in 1983.3 The subsequent facility-

1 Brooke Shelby Biggs, Solitary Confinement: A Brief History, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 3,
2009), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/03/solitary-confinement-briefnatural-history/.
2 See Ashley T. Rubin & Keramet Reiter, Continuity in the Face of Penal Innovation:
Revisiting the History of American Solitary Confinement, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1604, 1621
(2018). Cf. Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 289-90 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial
of cert.) (“In a case that presented the issue [of the constitutionality of solitary
confinement], the judiciary may be required, within its proper jurisdiction and
authority, to determine whether workable alternative systems for long-term
confinement exist, and, if so, whether a correctional system should be required to adopt
them.”).
3 Melanie Campbell, Vulnerable and Inadequately Protected: Solitary Confinement,
Individuals with Mental Illness, and the Laws that Fail to Protect, 264 HOFSTRA L. REV. 26869 (2016).
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wide solitary confinement at Marion State lasted twenty-three years.4
The “Marion Model”—characterized by “long-term, oftentimes
indefinite, disciplinary segregation in which inmates are placed in
virtually total isolation and severely restricted in their movements”—
has remained standard in correctional facilities for nearly three
decades.5
The tide of public opinion has since shifted and more advocacy for
the complete abolition of solitary confinement exists today.6 Some
states have responded to this shift and have begun to impose legislative
limits and guidelines on the use of solitary confinement.7 New Jersey
joined these states by passing the Isolated Confinement Restriction Act
(“the Act”) in July 2019.8 Some even hail the Act as the most progressive
piece of legislation limiting the use of solitary confinement in the
country.9 While the Act is an important step towards meaningful
limitations on solitary confinement in New Jersey, some of its provisions
are seriously flawed. Using the Act as an example, this Comment seeks
to demonstrate how even solitary confinement legislation that imposes
restrictions on the practice are overshadowed by exceptions that will
ultimately result in the continued misuse of the practice.
Part I will provide a background on solitary confinement, as well as
the physical and psychological effects it inflicts on inmates. Part II will
4 Sarah Childress & Michelle Mizner, “Lock It Down”: How Solitary Started in the U.S.,
PBS FRONTLINE (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lock-itdown-how-solitary-started-in-the-u-s/.
5 Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth
Amendment Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates
with a Mental Illness, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012).
6 See N.Y. CAMPAIGN FOR ALTS. TO ISOLATED CONFINEMENT, http://nycaic.org/ (last
visited
Jan.
17,
2021);
TOGETHER
TO
END
SOLITARY,
http://www.togethertoendsolitary.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021); UNLOCK THE BOX,
https://www.unlocktheboxcampaign.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
7 Eli Hager & Gerald Rich, Shifting Away From Solitary, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec.
23, 2014), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/23/shifting-away-fromsolitary (discussing the various legislative and administrative reforms to solitary
confinement across the states in 2014); State Legislation: Examples, NAT’L RELIGIOUS
CAMPAIGN AGAINST TORTURE, http://www.nrcat.org/torture-in-us-prisons/join-a-statecampaign/state-legislation-examples (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (providing examples of
state legislation that seeks to restrict the use of solitary confinement); Anne Teigen,
States That Limit or Prohibit Juvenile Shackling and Solitary Confinement, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civiland-criminal-justice/states-that-limit-or-prohibit-juvenile-shackling-and-solitaryconfinement635572628.aspx.
8 Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-82.5 – 30:4-92.11
(2019).
9 Catherine Kim, Solitary Confinement Isn’t Effective. That’s Why New Jersey Passed
a Law to Restrict It, VOX, (July 11, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/7/10/20681343/solitary-confinement-new-jersey.
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discuss the relevant provisions of the New Jersey Isolated Confinement
Act, with a focus on the restrictions on the use of solitary confinement,
and exceptions for its use. Part III analyzes the argument in favor of
abolition of solitary confinement. By using the Act as a model, this
section seeks to establish how legislation that carves out various
exceptions cancel out the restrictions set, such that solitary confinement
can continue to be overused and misused.
II. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS SOLITARY CONFINEMENT?
Solitary confinement is the practice used by correctional facilities
to restrict the movement, privileges, and social interactions of
inmates.10 Although the exact conditions vary by institution, there are
three basic elements of solitary confinement: voluntary or involuntary
removal from the general inmate population, placement in a locked
room or cell, and confinement to a cell for over twenty-two hours per
day.11 The cells are approximately eighty square feet, typically
containing only a bunk bed, sink, and toilet.12 An inmate in solitary has
only brief encounters with others, which can be as limited as an
employee sliding a food tray through the door.13 Inmates eat alone and
are granted around five hours of exercise per week, always alone and
typically in a small cage.14 Visitation, phone, possession of personal
property, and activity privileges are limited as well.15 Confinement can
last anywhere from a few days to years on end.16
Solitary confinement goes by many names, varying by state,
jurisdiction, and even facility. Other aliases for this practice include
disciplinary housing, supermax, Secure/Special Housing Unit (“SHU”),
maximum security, lockdown, administrative close supervision, room

10 Solitary Confinement (Isolation): Definition, NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE,
https://www.ncchc.org/solitary-confinement (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
11 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE
HOUSING
3
(Jan.
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/report-andrecommendations-concerning-use-restrictive-housing.
12 MATEO GASPAROTTO, ET. AL., ACLU, SILENT INJUSTICE: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN VIRGINIA
15 (2018).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See Sam Roberts, Thomas Silverstein, Killer and Most Isolated Inmate, Dies at 67,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
21,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/obituaries/thomas-silverstein-dead.html
(reporting on Thomas Silverstein, the inmate allegedly held in solitary confinement for
the longest time in the United States. He has been in solitary for 32 years.).
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confinement, or restricted engagement.17
Aside from “solitary
confinement,” it is most commonly referred to as isolation or isolated
confinement, as well as segregation or segregated confinement.
Opposition to the practice of solitary confinement is largely based on the
physical and psychological harms it inflicts on inmates. The practice
nonetheless remains widespread in correctional facilities.
A. Physical Effects of Solitary Confinement
While solitary confinement in and of itself may be used as
punishment, the very nature of the isolation tends to include the loss of
various other privileges. This can include partial or total restrictions of
exercise, restricted diet, as well as limited access to other activities.18
Physically immature juveniles entering prison are uniquely vulnerable
to inadequate exercise and nutrition and tend to experience stunted
growth.19 Many juvenile inmates also reported experiencing weight and
hair loss while in solitary, and some female juveniles even reported a
cessation of menstruation.20 Some solitary confinement restriction laws
have sought to ensure that restricted diets will not be used as an
additional means of punishment against an inmate already held in
solitary, but opinions regarding restrictions on exercise and other
activities vary.21 Studies have also found solitary confinement to be as
strong of a risk factor for mortality and morbidity as smoking, obesity,
high blood pressure, and living a sedentary lifestyle.22

17 GASPAROTTO, supra note 12, at 4 n.1; Brielle Basso, Solitary Confinement Reform Act:
A Blueprint For Restricted Use of Solitary Confinement of Juveniles Across the States, 48
SETON HALL L. REV. 1603 (2018).
18 Basso, supra note 17, at 1604-5.
19 Basso, supra note 17, at 1604-5.
20 Basso, supra note 17, at 1604-5.
21 Compare Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining how
then-Judge Kennedy wrote a unanimous opinion for the Ninth Circuit arguing that “it
was cruel and unusual punishment for a prisoner to be confined for a period of years
without the opportunity to go outside except for occasional court appearances, attorney
interviews, and hospital appointments.”), and Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071
(10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 5, (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of
cert.) (“[O]ur Constitution does not permit such a total deprivation [of exercise] in the
absence of a particularly compelling interest” but admitting that the factual record and
legal analysis of the lower courts as to the presence or absence of a compelling interest
was insufficient), with Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 5 (2018).
22 Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement Is Cruel
and Far Too Unusual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 755 (2015).

CHMIEL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/2/2021 9:22 AM

COMMENT

185

B. Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement
Perhaps the greatest risk of harm resulting from solitary
confinement is the severe psychological harm that can be inflicted. It is
well-documented that a period of solitary confinement can inflict
distress on the mental health of an inmate—including those who may
not have had a prior history of mental illness.23 Inmates subjected to
solitary have a shockingly high likelihood of engaging in self-harm,
suicide attempts, and suicide.24 Across correctional facilities, nearly half
of successful suicides occur in solitary confinement units.25
Common psychiatric symptoms reported by solitary confinement
inmates include anxiety, depression, illusions and hallucinations, panic
attacks, paranoia, difficulty concentrating, memory and impulse control,
and “intrusive obsessional (and often violent) thoughts.”26 During his
testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Human Rights, Professor Craig Haney, Ph.D., confirmed these
symptoms—and many more, such as anger, aggression, and even rage,
chronic insomnia and cognitive dysfunction.27 The very nature of
solitary confinement—isolation, stressful environment, and restricted
social interactions and activities—makes it difficult to withstand, even
for inmates without pre-existing mental health conditions.28 The effects
that solitary confinement has on inmates already suffering from mental
illness and developmental disabilities are thus even more likely to
“deepen into something more permanent and disabling.”29
23 See Rosalind Dillon, Banning Solitary for Prisoners with Mental Illness: The Blurred
Line Between Physical and Psychological Harm, 14 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 265, 277 (Jan. 1,
2019); Tamar Birckhead, Children in Isolation: The Solitary Confinement of Youth, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 11-15 (2015); see also Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208-10
(2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of cert.) (noting that the “common side effects
of solitary confinement include anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hallucinations, selfmutilation, and suicidal thoughts and behaviors.”) (citing Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric
Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 325 (2006)).
24 See Craig Haney, Restricting Solitary Confinement, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 285,
290 (2018); see also Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that
in 2011, the State Correctional Institution-Cresson reported that 80% of documented
suicides occurred in solitary confinement units).
25 Dillon, supra note 23, at 277.
26 Dillon, supra note 23, at 274-75.
27 Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety
Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitution, Civil Rights and Human
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 20-22 (2012) (statement of Craig
Haney, Professor, University of California, Santa Cruz).
28 Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long‐Term Solitary and “Supermax”
Confinement, 49. CRIME & DELINQUENCY, 124, 142 (Jan. 2003).
29 Id.; see also Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No.
1:08-cv-01317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182974 *41 (S.D. Ind., Dec. 31, 2012)
(“[Psychological] pain produces suffering, and a delay in treating [it] can reduce the
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III. A LEGISLATIVE “SOLUTION:” A BACKGROUND ON NEW JERSEY’S SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT RESTRICTION ACT
The open question of the legality of solitary confinement has
essentially left this issue to the states, which has resulted in varying
success. The most recent piece of legislation is New Jersey’s Isolated
Confinement Restriction Act, which was signed by Governor Phil
Murphy on July 11, 2019.30 This law has since been hailed as the “most
progressive” piece of solitary confinement restricting legislation.31 The
passage of the Act and its accompanying praise begs the question: can
solitary confinement even be meaningfully restricted? This Comment
seeks to answer that question in the negative by using the Act to
demonstrate that even “progressive,” well-intended legislation cannot
justify the use of solitary confinement, except in a narrow set of clearly
defined emergencies.
To provide background, the following sections will briefly discuss
the relevant provisions of the Act. Part A discusses the two types of
restrictions placed on the use of solitary confinement in New Jersey
correctional facilities. Part B discusses the Act’s exceptions that
delineate the circumstances under which a correctional facility may
place an inmate in solitary confinement. Part C provides an overview of
the Act’s provisions on staff training, as well as the appeals processes
available to inmates placed into solitary confinement.
A. The Act’s Restrictions
1. General Restrictions: When and for how long may an
inmate be placed in solitary confinement?
One of the most important provisions of a solitary confinement
restriction law is the law’s definition of solitary confinement because it
describes the conditions and maximum duration of confinement
permitted. The Act defines solitary confinement as the:
confinement of an inmate in a correctional facility, pursuant
to disciplinary, administrative, protective, investigative,
medical, or other classification, in a cell or similarly confined
holding or living space, alone or with other inmates, for
chances of a mentally ill prisoner achieving or re-establishing an optimal level of
functioning.”).
30 Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, A. 314, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2019).
31 Kim, supra note 9.
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approximately [twenty] hours or more per day in a state
correctional facility or twenty-two hours or more per day in a
county correctional facility, with severely restricted activity,
movement, and social interaction.32
In addition to New Jersey’s twenty to twenty-two hour limit set in
the definition, the Act also prohibits more than twenty consecutive days
of solitary confinement or more than thirty days over a sixty-day
period.33 It is worth noting, however, that when the New Jersey
Legislature first attempted to pass a solitary confinement restriction bill
in 2016, the proposed limit was fifteen consecutive days or twenty days
in a sixty-day period.34 This first attempt passed in the legislature but
was vetoed by then-Governor Chris Christie.35 Although the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture declared that any period of
solitary confinement longer than fifteen days constituted torture,
Colorado is the only state to institute such a limitation.36
The Act also sets general requirements governing when an inmate
may be placed in solitary confinement, placing the burden of proof on
the correctional facility to show: (a) a reasonable cause for the
placement, (b) substantial risk of harm to the inmate or others, (c)
specific evidence as a basis for the need, and (d) that there were no
feasible alternatives to alleviate the potential harm.37
2. Purpose-based Restrictions: Administrative and
Disciplinary Segregation
There are generally two forms of solitary confinement—
disciplinary and non-disciplinary segregation.38
Disciplinary
segregation refers to the violation of a specific rule by an inmate and a
determinate period of placement in solitary confinement as
32

Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-82.7 (2019).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4:82.8(a)(9).
34 See Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, A. 547, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2016); Stephanie
Wykstra, The Case Against Solitary Confinement, VOX (Apr. 17, 2019)
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/4/17/18305109/solitary-confinementprison-criminal-justice-reform (noting that Colorado is the only state to have
implemented the fifteen-day U.N. standard).
35 Kim, supra note 9.
36 Wykstra, supra note 34; UNITED NATIONS, Solitary Confinement Should Be Banned in
Most
Cases,
UN
Expert
Says,
(Oct.
18,
2011)
https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/10/392012-solitary-confinement-should-bebanned-most-cases-un-expert-says; (noting that the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Torture, Juan E. Méndez, stated solitary confinement lasting more than fifteen days
is torture and thus, should be prohibited).
37 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4:82.8(a)(1).
38 Samuel Fuller, Torture as a Management Practice: The Convention Against Torture
and Non‐Disciplinary Solitary Confinement, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 102, 106 (2018).
33
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punishment.39 The Act contains virtually no provisions on disciplinary
segregation aside from three conditions to placement pending
investigation of an alleged disciplinary offense by an inmate. First, in
determining to place an inmate in investigative disciplinary solitary
confinement based on the above factors, the Act requires consideration
of the seriousness of the alleged offense.40 The Act states that examples
of offenses that would warrant such placement include offenses
including violence, escape, or “encouraging others to engage in
misconduct.”41 Second, the Act requires approval from the facility
administrator for placement in this alleged emergency situation.42 By
having one individual responsible for this determination, it is clear
exactly who would be accountable in the event of misuse. To further
limit the possibility of abuse, the Act requires review of placement
“within 24 hours [of placement] by a supervisory employee who was not
involved in the initial placement.”43
Contrarily, the Act does prohibit “non-disciplinary” solitary
confinement, which it refers to as “administrative” segregation.44
Despite this ban on administrative segregation, as well as the reference
to it in the Act’s definition of solitary confinement, the Act fails to
explicitly define “administrative” or even non-disciplinary solitary
confinement.45 Administrative segregation is typically defined as
placement of an individual deemed by officials as a current or future risk
to other prisoners or staff.46
B. Non‐Disciplinary Exceptions
Despite the Act’s purported ban on administrative segregation, the
Act carves out three exceptions permitting its use. First, the Act creates
a lockdown exception permitting the facility-wide use of solitary
confinement in the event of an emergency.47 The facility administrator
or shift commander makes the determination to commence a lockdown,
as well as the determination that the mitigating circumstances no longer

39

U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 4.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.9(a)(1).
41 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.9(a)(1).
42 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.9(a)(2).
43 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.9(b).
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4:82.8(a)(2) (“[A]n inmate shall not be placed in isolated
confinement for non-disciplinary reasons.”).
45 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4:82.7.
46 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 SURVEY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 1 (Aug. 2015).
47 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1).
40
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exist and such a lockdown can be lifted.48 If the lockdown lasts for more
than twenty-four hours, the administrator must specify why it was
necessary, and why less restrictive alternatives were “insufficient to
accomplish the facility’s safety goals.”49 These justifications must be
posted to the Department of Corrections website within fifteen days of
the lockdown, and meaningful notice of these reasons must be provided
to the Legislature.50
Second, the Act permits a protective-custody exception: permitting
confinement of an inmate in a cell, or similarly confined holding or living
space, when the facility administrator determines it is necessary to
protect the inmate or others.51 Such conditions include a real or
perceived threat to the inmate for reasons such as gang affiliation, debts,
involvement in or with law enforcement, sexual orientation, or gender
identity.52 Protective custody of an inmate may be voluntary or
involuntary.53
Voluntary protective custody allows an inmate to give informed,
voluntary consent to isolation “when there is reasonable cause to
believe that confinement is necessary to prevent reasonably foreseeable
harm.”54 The correctional facility must keep a written record of such
requests, and in the event that the facility rejects the request, they bear
the burden of establishing their reasons for rejection.55 The inmate
must also be permitted to opt-out of voluntary protective custody by
“providing informed, voluntary, written refusal of that status.”56 The
voluntary protective-custody provision comes with three important
qualifications to ensure against its misuse. First, the Act requires the
correctional facility to attempt a less restrictive form of segregation
prior to voluntary solitary confinement, such as a transfer to the general
population at another facility or a transfer to special purpose housing
for similarly threatened inmates.57 Such transfers are not required, and
consequently, the inmate will be place in solitary confinement if the
facility determines that the security risk is so high “that transferring the
48

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1).
50 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1).
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4).
52 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 23; see also, e.g., United States v. D.W., 198 F.
Supp. 3d 18, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[O]ften, the only means of protection available to
vulnerable inmates is separation from the general population.”).
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(a)(b).
54 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(a).
55 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(a).
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(e).
57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(f).
49
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inmate would be insufficient to ensure the inmate’s safety.”58 Further,
because voluntary custody entails an inmate requesting segregation—
as opposed to punitive segregation—this provision ensures that other
restrictions be enacted against such an inmate, such as in their
“activities, movement and social interactions,” within the bounds of the
needed protection for the inmate or others.59 Lastly, if the facility
attempts to remove the inmate from voluntary protective custody, the
inmate must be provided a “timely, fair, and meaningful opportunity to
contest the removal.”60 As for involuntary protective custody, the Act
requires clear and convincing evidence of the necessity to prevent a
reasonably foreseeable harm, as well as evidence that there were no
feasible less restrictive alternatives.61 The Act also permits a medical
isolation exception.62 The Act’s definition of “medical isolation” includes
the need to “[prevent] the spread of a communicable disease” and for
“mental health emergenc[ies].”63
C. Appeals Process for Inmates & Staff Training
Two other important factors necessary for the meaningful
restriction of solitary confinement are rules governing the appeals
process for inmates to contest placement, and staff training. While the
Isolated Confinement Restriction Act sufficiently addresses the latter,
the provisions governing appeals are lacking.
Correctional facilities across the country lack clear policies on how
inmates may appeal their assignment to solitary confinement, as well as
those policies that detail how they can work to exit solitary, such as
favorable or unfavorable behavior.64 The sheer quantity of rules
governing prison life alone are obstacles in and of itself for inmates.
These rules—including those governing the appeals process for solitary
confinement—tend to be scattered, and at times, even contradictory.65

58

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(f).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(c).
60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(d).
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(b).
62 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(3).
63 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.7.
64 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH. & ASS’N OF ST. CORRECTIONAL ADMIN., TIME-IN-CELL: THE
ASCA-LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON i, 9 (2015)
(“[G]etting into segregation was relatively easy, and few policies focused on how people
got out,” nor was it “a focus of the rules.”).
65 Michelle Ghafar, Exiting Solitary Confinement: A Survey of State Correctional
Policies, 64 UCLA L. REV. 508, 527-39 (2017) (noting that, in a ten-state survey of
correctional facilities, varying rules governing an inmate’s ability to exit solitary
confinement were found within Departments of Corrections’ sections on classification
59
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Moreover, they tend to be vague and highly discretionary with review
processes occurring far too infrequently; New Jersey’s Act is
demonstrative of this.
Section 30:4-82.8(a)(4) is the appeals provision of the Act, stating
that an inmate must be afforded “timely, fair and meaningful
opportunities . . . to contest the confinement” within seventy-two hours
of placement.66 The provision claims that the inmate is entitled to
appear and “be represented at the hearing; an independent hearing
officer; and a written statement of reasons for the decision made at the
hearing.”67 There is no clarification as to who may represent the inmate,
who the independent hearing officer is, in what capacity the officer
advocates for the inmate, who is present at the hearing, or even what
the guidelines are for what the review committee is seeking from the
inmate. Further, it is worth noting that, in addition to not clarifying who
sits on this review committee, the Act itself states that “the final decision
to place an inmate in isolated confinement shall be made by the facility
administrator.”68 Importantly, the Act does not require notice to be
provided to the inmate for whom placement in solitary confinement is
being considered.69 Moreover, after the initial hearing within the first
seventy-two hours, a review of such placement only occurs every thirty
days.70 The language of this provision is notably at odds with Section
30:4-82.8(a)(9), which prohibits isolated confinement for “more than
[twenty] consecutive days, or for more than [thirty] days during any
[sixty]-day period.”71 Overall, it is disappointing that a progressive
piece of legislation failed in such a way to clarify and strengthen the
appeals process for inmates, and as a whole the Isolated Confinement
Restriction Act does not fare better in this area compared to other
states.72
policies, appeals systems, grievance systems, personal interviews, documentation, and
review processes).
66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(4).
67 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(4).
68 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(5).
69 See, e.g., MODEL ACT: IMPROVING PUBLIC SAFETY, PROTECTING VULNERABLE POPULATIONS &
ENSURING DUE PROCESS IN IMPOSING LONG-TERM ISOLATED CONFINEMENT § 4(C)(I) (ACLU
NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 2011) (ON FILE WITH ACLU) (“The [prisoner] must receive written
and effective notice at least 48 hours before the hearing that such placement is being
considered, the facts upon which consideration is based, and the [prisoner’s] rights
under this Act, and any regulations or policies promulgated under this Act;”).
70 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(4).
71 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(9).
72 Ghafar, supra note 65, at 529 (noting that across ten states that together house
more than half of the prisoners in the United States, the most common form of prisoner
involvement in the exit process was during classification review where inmates may
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The Act also addresses the need for staff training. Section 30:482.11(b) requires the creation of procedures by the facility
commissioner for the training of disciplinary staff and solitary
confinement staff.73 Pursuant to the Act, this training must include
periodic assistance from appropriate professionals, standards
emphasizing the restrictive circumstances under which solitary
confinement may be used, how to identify developmental disabilities,
how to identify the symptoms of mental illness and trauma disorders, as
well as how to safely respond to people in distress.74 The Act also states
that such training must include information of the facility’s standards
for solitary confinement.75 These standards “shall be limited to when an
inmate commits an offense involving violence, escapes or attempts to
escape, or poses a threat to institutional safety; that the maximum
penalties for each offense shall be based on the seriousness of the
offense; and available less restrictive interventions.”76 Considering the
issue surrounding the traditional deference afforded to correctional
facilities in their policies and procedures, it is particularly important for
senior management to set the tone on their views towards the use of
solitary confinement. Executive Director of the Colorado Department of
Corrections, Rick Raemisch—who was able to lower the consecutive day
limit on solitary confinement to fifteen days—responded to those who
asked how he changed the culture of reliance and overuse of solitary
confinement by saying, “It’s not a question of culture. It’s a question of
leadership.”77 By implementing clear conditions on when and how
solitary confinement may be used and reiterating them through
training, it follows that there are likely to be fewer incidences of abuse
by officials.
The Act requires the commissioner to develop procedures for these
training opportunities by August 2020 when the Isolated Confinement
Restriction Act goes into effect.78 Regarding mental health training, the
ACLU recommends at least eight hours of instruction on the types and
symptoms of mental illness for all officers and staff.79 Staff working in
any mental health or “step-down” units must attend an additional forty“participate in hearings or interviews with prison administrators, and receive copies of
the final placement decision”).
73 N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b).
74 N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b)(1)-(3).
75 N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b)(2).
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b)(2).
77 ASS’N OF ST. CORRECTIONAL ADMIN. & YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE
2018 ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 68 (2018).
78 N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b).
79 MODEL ACT, supra note 69 at § 3(a).
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hours of initial instruction as well as twelve hours annually if they
continue to work in that unit.80 In its recommendations for the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice noted that the Bureau
required quarterly mental health training of restrictive housing staff as
well as specialized suicide prevention training for “health care
providers, lieutenants, chaplains, and correctional counselors.”81 The
Act notably only requires “periodic” assistance from professionals on
the use of solitary confinement, but it is unclear whether “periodic”
assistance extends to the training on disabilities, disorders, and mental
illness.82 Mental health training is important for screening the
symptoms and needs of the mentally ill, especially those who often
“cannot make their needs known to mental health staff.”83
IV. ANALYSIS: WHY ABOLITION IS THE ONLY SOLUTION
The common justification for solitary confinement is its use as a
necessary last resort against dangerous and violent prisoners.84 While
this justification stems from legitimate safety concerns by prison
officials, there is no evidence that solitary confinement deters inmates
from misbehaving.85 Moreover, the common perception that solitary
confinement is only reserved for the worst of the worst is not borne out
by the evidence, despite its apparent justifications on the grounds of
safety.86 Empirical studies show that only a minority of the solitary
confinement population are the result of violence or dangerousness.87
80

MODEL ACT, supra note 69 at § 3(a).
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 57; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note
11 at 80, 118 (noting that The National Institute of Corrections provides a 32-hour
“Management of Restrictive Housing Populations” training program that includes
training, technical assistance, information services, and policy development assistance
to federal, state, and local correctional agencies).
82 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b)(1).
83 Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1550 (D. Ariz. 1993).
84 Anthony Gangi, Why We Need Solitary Confinement in Corrections, CORRECTIONS 1
(May 31, 2016), https://www.correctionsone.com/public-perceptions/articles/whywe-need-solitary-confinement-in-corrections-FRkqBaMQYSXFqIsw/; see also LIMAN
PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 8 (Aug. 27, 2015) (“Several states . . . specified that
the purpose of administrative segregation was not punitive, but to ensure the safety and
security of prisoners and staff.”) [hereinafter 2014 National Survey].
85 ALISON SHAMES, ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: COMMON
MISCONCEPTIONS AND EMERGING SAFE ALTERNATIVES 20 (May 2015).
86 Id. at 12.
87 See, e.g., id.; LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018
ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 60 (Oct. 2018) (“[W]e learned that the
criteria for placing prisoners in isolation were broad, as was the discretion afforded
correctional staff to place individuals”); THE N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, Lawsuit: Syracuse
Jail is Harming Children With Abusive Solitary Confinement Conditions (Sept. 21, 2016),
81
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Most placements in solitary confinement are for being perceived as
potentially violent but without committing a violent act or breaking
prison rules.88 Further, the prison rules violated are often minor
infractions such as failure to obey orders, using abusive language, or
moving during a count.89 Although the safe operation of a correctional
facility is important, the data does not support the correlation between
the use of solitary confinement and safety.90
Part of what makes solitary confinement inherently problematic is
that any justifications for its use tend to be punitive in nature, even if the
stated reason for an inmate’s placement is characterized as nondisciplinary. Solitary confinement erupted when correctional facilities
were faced with the dilemma of how to punish the punished.91
Considering the horrifying effects that any period of solitary
confinement may have, justification is wholesomely difficult—even as a
means of punishment.92
Furthermore, solitary confinement is
inefficient at achieving its purported goal of deterring inmate
misbehavior or violence. In fact, solitary confinement increases the
likelihood of recidivism.93
Using New Jersey’s Isolated Confinement Restriction Act as an
example, this section seeks to establish a two-fold argument. First,
solitary confinement must be abolished as both a management tool and
a form of punishment in correctional facilities because solitary
confinement is a short-term solution that contributes to the problems
that it purports to solve. The effects solitary confinement inflicts on
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/lawsuit-syracuse-jail-harming-childrenabusive-solitary-confinement-conditions (reporting that one inmate was placed in
solitary confinement for singing a Whitney Houston song in his cell).
88 SHAMES, supra note 85, at 12.
89 SHAMES, supra note 85, at 14.
90 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN THE U.S. ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 18 (Nov. 2016) (“Using data from three states (Arizona, Illinois, and
Minnesota) and one control state (Utah), and a multiple interrupted timeseries design,
Briggs, Sundt, and Castellano (2003) . . . . concluded that ‘the bulk of the evidence
presented here suggests that supermax is not effective at reducing system wide levels if
prison violence.”).
91 See e.g., Childress, supra note 4 (discussing the alleged origins of supermax
prisons and the reliance on solitary confinement after two guards were violently
murdered at Illinois’ Marion State Penitentiary in 1983).
92 See Haney, supra note 28 at 132.
93 SHAMES, supra note 85, at 20 (“[T]here is no evidence that confinement in a
supermax facility produces a deterrent effect on the individual. A recent study [also]
found that exposure to short-term disciplinary segregation as a punishment for initial
violence did not deter incarcerated people from committing further violence in
prison.”); SHAMES, supra note 85, at 26 (finding that some states reported higher
recidivism rates among supermax inmates and inmates who had been held in solitary
confinement).
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inmates—regardless of subjection to disciplinary or non-disciplinary
segregation—supports this proposition. Second, the Act and similar
legislation nominally address the issue of solitary confinement without
substantive changes that will effectively curb its practice.
Even “progressive” legislation intended to broadly restrict solitary
confinement is insufficient when it carves out various exceptions, which
consequently lead to the overuse and misuse of the practice.94 In effect,
the broad and arbitrary exceptions overshadow any provisions in the
Act that would seriously curtail the use of solitary confinement.
1. Analyzing the Act: What Works and What Does Not
One of the simplest yet most important provisions in solitary
confinement legislation is the operative definition because this
definition lays the framework for what constitutes acceptable
conditions of solitary confinement. Moreover, a definition typically
states the number of isolation hours that legally constitute solitary
confinement.95 For New Jersey, the Act restricts the amount of time that
an inmate can sit in segregation, which cannot exceed twenty days, or
more than thirty days within a period of sixty days, making it the lowest
time restriction set by state legislation.96 Many other jurisdictions
define solitary confinement as segregation for twenty-two to twentyfour hours a day.97

94

See Kim, supra note 9.
S.B. 3495, State S., 2017-2018 Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
96 Kim, supra note 9.
97 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, The Humane Alternatives to Long‐Term (“HALT”)
Solitary Confinement Act, https://www.nyclu.org/en/legislation/humane-alternativeslong-term-halt-solitary-confinement-act (referring to state law permitting solitary
confinement for twenty-three hours per day) (last visited Jan. 19, 2021); THE S. POVERTY
L. CTR, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: INHUMANE, INEFFECTIVE, AND WASTEFUL 7 (Apr. 2019) (noting
that in Florida, solitary confinement refers to isolation for twenty-two to twenty-four
hours per day); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUG & CRIMES, THE UNITED NATIONS STANDARD
MINIMUM
RULES
FOR
TREATMENT
OF
PRISONERS
14
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prisonreform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) (defining
solitary confinement as isolation lasting twenty-hours per day); Rick Raemisch, Why I
Ended the Horror of Long‐Term Solitary in Colorado’s Prisons, ACLU (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/solitary-confinement/why-i-endedhorror-long-term-solitary-colorados-prisons (referring to Colorado’s policy of solitary
confinement placement for twenty-two hours per day); Burke Butler, et. al., A Solitary
Failure: The Waste, Cost and Harm of Solitary Confinement in Texas, THE AM. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION OF TEX. (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.aclutx.org/en/report/a-solitary-failure
(discussing solitary confinement in Texas, which refers to isolation for twenty-two
hours per day).
95
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Despite the clarity of the general definition in the Act, it notably
fails to define administrative or investigative segregation.98 The sheer
inclusion of these categories in the Act causes confusion as both are
forms of non-disciplinary segregation, which is banned by Section 30:482.8(a)(2).99 Nor do any of the three exceptions include administrative
or investigative isolation.100
2. The Restrictions and Exceptions
The Act highlights the inherent tension between broad restrictions
and its manifold exceptions. Together these two essential components
paint the picture of a good faith attempt to address the issue, the product
of a well-meaning legislature. But despite the praise it has received,101
this Act only nominally addresses solitary confinement. The Act is
composed of dozens of little compromises that when aggregated and
implemented will result in continued misuse of this practice. This
section analyzes how the quantity and content of the exceptions that
permit the use of solitary confinement overpower the restrictions of the
Act.
1. The Restrictions
The Act has been praised as “the most progressive legislative
reform to the practice of solitary confinement in the [United States]”
because of the restrictions. 102 The Act sets when, against whom, and for
how long solitary may be used.
i. Twenty-day limit
In addition to the twenty-hour “limit” discussed above, the Act
similarly imposes restrictions on how many days an inmate may be held
in solitary confinement. Section 30:4-82.8(a)(9) prohibits solitary
confinement lasting more than twenty consecutive days or more than
thirty days over a sixty-day period.103 The necessity of clear legislative
restrictions on the permitted duration of confinement cannot be
overstated. It is a common misperception that solitary confinement is a
brief sentence for inmates.104 While disciplinary solitary confinement is
supposed to last a definite period of time by definition, more often than
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-82.7 (2019).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-82.7.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-82.8(a)(2).
Kim, supra note 9.
Kim, supra note 9.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3:4-82.8(a)(9).
SHAMES, supra note 85, at 15.
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not, an individual remains in solitary confinement beyond that time
period.105 Still, non-disciplinary or administrative solitary confinement
are notoriously problematic because such confinements allow for
indefinite sentences.106
The Act’s duration restriction provides a good example of a
provision that is comparatively better than other states, however still
insufficient. In most other states the durational limit is no more than
thirty consecutive days.107 The United Nations has stated that any
period of solitary confinement longer than fifteen days constitutes
torture.108 Considering that New Jersey’s first attempt at a solitary
confinement law in 2016, vetoed by then-Governor Chris Christie,
passed in both houses with a fifteen-day restriction, it is disappointing
that it was compromised for the Act.109 Furthermore, only one state,
Colorado, has already successfully instituted the fifteen-day
recommended restriction.110 Additionally, as the permanence and
severity of the effects of solitary confinement become more universally
understood—as well as how quickly they can set in—it becomes harder
to justify the practice based on any justification, especially punishment.

105 Compare U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 4 (defining disciplinary solitary
confinement as punishment that lasts for a determinate term for violation of a specific
rule), with SHAMES, supra note 85, at 15 (reporting that in federal prison and at least
nineteen states, solitary confinement is permitted for an indefinite period. This report
also noted that’s in 2009, the average solitary confinement term was over six years in
Illinois supermax prisons and nearly four years in Texas correctional facilities), and
LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN
NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 14 (Oct. 2018) (noting that according to an aggregate
of data from responding jurisdictions, about one-fifth of inmates were held for fifteen
days to one month, and almost 10% were held for more than three years).
106 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 4 (defining administrative solitary
confinement as punishment that lasts for an indeterminate term).
107 See, e.g., THE S. POVERTY L. CTR, supra note 97, at 8 (discussing Florida’s policy that
disciplinary solitary confinement is permitted for between thirty and sixty days, and no
more than ninety); Dan M. Clark, NY Proposes New Curbs on Use of Solitary Confinement
in
State
Prisons,
Local
Jails,
N.Y.
L.
J.
(Aug.
28,
2019).
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/28/ny-proposes-new-curbs-onuse-of-solitary-confinement-in-state-prisons-local-jails/ (reporting on the new rules
proposed by lawmakers to phase in a 30-day cap on solitary confinement over the next
three years); KATIE ROSE QUANDT, ET AL., SOLITARY WATCH, LOUISIANA ON LOCKDOWN: A REPORT
ON THE USE OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN LOUISIANA STATE PRISONS, WITH TESTIMONY FROM THE
PEOPLE WHO LIVE IT ,70 (June 2019) (noting that Louisiana Department of Corrections’
solitary confinement policy is a review every ninety days).
108 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 36.
109 Kim, supra note 9.
110 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCALIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 67 (Oct. 2018).
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ii. Ban on Non-Disciplinary Solitary Confinement
Notably, the Act also stands out because of its ban of solitary
confinement for non-disciplinary reasons, though subject to some
exceptions.111 Non-disciplinary solitary confinement tends to be
synonymous with “administrative segregation,” which is typically used
when an inmate is perceived as a current or future threat to others.112
This form of solitary confinement is problematic for two primary
reasons. First, administrative segregation often entails confinement for
an unspecified time period.113 For the 2015 Yale Law School report on
administrative segregation, thirty-two out of forty-four responding
jurisdictions self-reported that their correctional facilities had no
minimum time period for administrative segregation.114 Notably, fortytwo out of the same forty-four jurisdictions also reported no maximum
confinement period.115 The Isolated Confinement Restriction Act is
commendable for enacting a twenty-consecutive-day limit, compared to
many states’ thirty-day limit.116
Second, administrative segregation tends to be a “catch-all”
category for the justification of placement of inmates in solitary
confinement; the criteria for placement and discretion wielded by those
in charge of the placement tends to be broad.117 Further, because
111

Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-82.8(a)(2) (2019).
LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 SURVEY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 1 (Aug. 2015); see also U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra
note 11, at 4.
113 See McClary v. Kelly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 195, 211 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that a plaintiff
inmate had a right to due process because he was held in administrative segregation for
four years in violation of the prison’s own rules requiring “specific reasons why
administrative segregation is warranted.”); U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 4.
114 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 SURVEY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 10, 27, n.96, n.97 (Aug. 2015) (The forty-six
responding jurisdictions included forty-four states, the District of Colombia and Federal
Bureau of Prisons. The six states that did not respond were California, Idaho, Maine,
Maryland, New Mexico, and Vermont).
115 Id. at 27.
116 See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 36 (noting that the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Torture, Juan E. Méndez, stated solitary confinement lasting more than
15 days is torture and thus, should be prohibited); THE S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 97,
at 8 (finding that in Florida, punitive solitary confinement typically lasted between 30
to 60 days, and administrative confinement has a maximum limit of 90 days, which is
notably not always followed); Clark, supra note 107 (reporting on the new rules
proposed by lawmakers to phase in a 30-day cap on solitary confinement over the next
three years); VIRGINIA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS OPERATING PROCEDURE, Offender Discipline,
Institutions No. 861.1, § 6(A)(5), https://vadoc.virginia.gov/files/operatingprocedures/800/vadoc-op-861-1.pdf (permitting solitary confinement for a maximum
of 30 days).
117 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 SURVEY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 8 (Aug. 2015).
112
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administrative segregation tends to occur if there is a perceived threat,
often inmates who act out tend to fall under the umbrella of
administrative segregation.118 Many “misbehaving” inmates are acting
under the duress of a mental illness, or symptoms of it.119 As such,
placement in solitary is hardly a solution.120 In addition to this
definition, the Act also states five classifications of segregation of
inmates from general population: emergency confinement, isolated
confinement, less restrictive intervention, medical isolation, and
protective custody.121 While the Act’s non-disciplinary solitary
confinement ban can be considered one of its achievements, the next
section will explain how it will be undermined in application of the
various exceptions.
2. The Exceptions
As discussed in Section I(B)(3), the Act contains three exceptions
to the prohibition of non-disciplinary solitary confinement: the
lockdown exception, protective custody exception, and medical
emergency exception.122 Each exception explains in varying detail the
circumstances under which correctional facilities may place an inmate
118 See Maureen L. O’Keefe et al., One Year Longitudinal Study of the Psychological
Effects of Administrative Segregation, CO DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, 82 (2010), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232973.pdf (“It is impossible to ignore the
extremely disproportionate rate at which inmates with serious mental illness are
assigned to [administrative segregation].”); David Lovell, Patterns of Disturbed Behavior
in a Supermax Population, 35(8) CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV., 985, 990 (2008) (“Serious mental
illness can safely be attributed to at least 25% of supermax prisoners in this study” of
122 inmates across 3 Supermax prisons in Washington’s prison system at the time); see
also Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1121 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (“Defendants’
screening process is not a reasonable safeguard against housing seriously mentally ill
inmates at Supermax because it is not designed to keep seriously mentally ill inmates
out of Supermax.”), Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d on
other grounds, 178 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1999) (“ Furthermore, plaintiffs submitted credible
evidence of a pattern in TDCJ of housing mentally ill inmates in administrative
segregation—inmates who, to be treated, would have to be removed to inpatient care.”).
119 See Ashley Halvorsen, Solitary Confinement of Mentally Ill Prisoners: A National
Overview & How the ADA Can Be Leveraged to Encourage Best Practices, 27 S. CAL.
INTERDIS. L.J., 205, 206 (2017) (“[N]ot only are the mentally ill more likely to be placed in
solitary confinement, they often find it exceedingly difficult to meet the requirements to
be released back into the general prison population.”); Rebecca Wallace, Out of Sight, Out
of Mind: Colorado’s Continued Warehousing of Mentally Ill Prisoners in Solitary
Confinement,
ACLU
COLO.
(2013),
http://aclu-co.org/wpcontent/uploads/files/imce/Solitary%20Report.pdf
(discussing
the
Colorado
Department of Corrections practice.of “continued warehousing of mentally ill prisoners
in solitary confinement”).
120 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 90 at 11.
121 Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.7 (2019).
122 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d).
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in solitary confinement for reasons other than violation of a rule.123 The
sections below will analyze each exception and discuss which
components are necessary for the safe operation of correctional
facilities, and which are inherently problematic primarily because they
tend to be punitively misused.
i. Lockdown Exception
First, the Act permits a lockdown exception if it is determined that
one is necessary to ensure the safety of the inmates until the
circumstances no longer exist.124 Ideally, facility-wide lockdowns
should be the only permitted instance of solitary confinement; the
circumstances that trigger this are limited instances where the danger
to inmates and prison officials are serious.125 Unlike administrative
solitary confinement where the justification for placement is based on
some perceived future threat, lockdown only occurs in response to
events.126 Moreover, the Act protects against possible misuse with
reporting requirements.127
ii. Protective Custody
The Act also permits a protective custody exception, which allows
the isolation of an inmate either at the discretion of a facility
administrator or at the request of the inmate.128 Protective custody can
be a useful tool to remove a vulnerable inmate from the general
population based on perceived threats, often due to immutable
123

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1).
125 See, e.g., Childress, supra note 4; Marisa Iati, Five Mississippi Inmates were Killed in
a Week, Officials Say. Then Two Went Missing, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/01/03/mississippi-prisonslockdown-after-five-inmates-killed-week/ (discussing an incident at Parchman in
which five prisoners were killed and several were injured, resulting in a lockdown);
Suzanne Moore, “Large‐Scale Fights” Leads to Lockdown at NY Facility Where Two
Escaped, CORRECTIONSONE (Aug. 30, 2015), https://www.correctionsone.com/riots-andcrowd-control/articles/large-scale-fights-leads-to-lockdown-at-ny-facility-where-2escaped-HZj5g8Ua4gOwPPQE/ (reporting on two large-scale, violent fights that
occurred at Clinton Correctional Facility, resulting in lockdown).
126 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 SURVEY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 8 (Aug. 2015).
127 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1) (requiring that if the lockdown lasted for more
than twenty-four hours, the prison official documents the specific reasons for its
necessity and why alternatives were insufficient. These reasons must also be published
on the Department of Corrections website within fifteen days of the lockdown, and
meaningful notice of the reasons must be provided to the Legislature).
128 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.7 (defining protective custody as the “confinement of an
inmate in a cell or similar confined holding or living space, under conditions necessary
to protect the inmate or others.”).
124
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characteristics such as disabilities or sexual orientation.129 As discussed
in Section III(B) above, the Act sets fairly clear guidelines to regulate this
exception—particularly in instances of involuntary protective
custody.130 There are, however, issues with this exception.
First, the Act asserts that protective custody inmates must receive
similar privileges, such as activities, movement, and social contact, as
inmates in general population.131 Whether this is likely to occur or is
even feasible, however, is questionable. And if it does become common
practice in New Jersey correctional facilities, it is unlikely that the
privileges permitted for protective custody inmates will be similar to
those permitted for general population.132 Further, the privileges
provision of the protective custody exception is at odds with another
provision. Section 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(f) requires that before the facility
use protective custody, the facility must attempt a less restrictive
intervention, including transfer “to a special-purpose housing unit for
inmates who face similar threats.”133 At least one other state has already
successfully implemented such a specialized unit that is separate from
both general population and solitary confinement housing.134 If such a
special-purpose housing is available in facilities in the state, why are
they not the default placement for inmates in need of protection?
Further, this exception also stands at odds with the Act’s
prohibition on the use of solitary confinement against vulnerable
populations.135 Despite the different name, protective custody is
solitary confinement, nonetheless. This exception effectively overrides
the prohibition on solitary confinement of members of a vulnerable
population, so long as the correctional places the inmates in solitary
confinement under the euphemism of protective custody.
While the restrictions set on the protective custody exception
appear beneficial, they nonetheless highlight how solitary confinement
by any name cannot be divorced from its punitive roots. Protective
custody is not the only or most effective solution to this common
129 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 4; see also United States v. D.W., 198 F. Supp.
3d 18, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[O]ften, the only means of protection available to vulnerable
inmates is separation from the general population.”).
130 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(b).
131 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(c).
132 See QUANDT, supra note 107, at 93.
133 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(f).
134 SHAMES, supra note 85, at 22 (reporting on Washington’s “Skill Building Unit,”
which houses and provides out-of-cell programming for intellectually and
developmentally disabled inmates).
135 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(b) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection d. of
this section, an inmate who is a member of a vulnerable population shall not be placed
in isolated confinement.”).
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predicament for correctional facilities.136 It is counterproductive at
best, and harmful at worst, to hold the most vulnerable inmates in the
same restrictive conditions as violent, misbehaving inmates.137
iii. The Medical Isolation Exception
The Act permits medical isolation to “prevent[] the spread of a
communicable disease,” as well as “mental health emergenc[ies].”138
Like the lockdown exception, the first portion of the medical isolation
exception—using solitary confinement as a means to quarantine an
infectious inmate—is an understandably necessary and acceptable
circumstance that requires such an extreme response.
Notwithstanding, the latter half of the exception is one of the most
problematic exceptions of the Act.
It is a dangerous misperception that isolating an inmate who is
experiencing a mental health emergency in solitary confinement
conditions is the only solution. Nor is it an appropriate response.139 The
consequences of relying on solitary confinement as a tool for managing
and treating the mentally ill are far-reaching. There are three pertinent
issues with correctional facilities’ overreliance on solitary confinement
of the mentally ill. First, it is well-documented that the psychological
implications of solitary confinement are so severe that it engenders
symptoms of mental illness in any prison.140 It follows that inmates
suffering from pre-existing mental health issues experience
exacerbation of their symptoms, as well as complications with reestablishing social functionality.141 One researcher even concluded that
“there is not a single published study of solitary or supermax-like
confinement in which nonvoluntary confinement lasting for longer than

136

See SHAMES, supra note 85, at 22.
See SHAMES, supra note 85, at 28.
138 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.7.
139 See SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS
AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 34 (2003) (arguing that the manner with which
prison staff treats inmates who are suffering from a mental illness episode is
inappropriate and can aggravate the issue).
140 See Dillon, supra note 23, at 275; see also Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of
Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J. L. POL’Y 325, 333 (2006) (“I have observed that, for
many of the inmates so housed, incarceration in solitary caused . . . the appearance of
acute mental illness in individuals who had previously been free of any such illness.”).
141 See Bennion, supra note 23, at 743 (“Prisoners entering solitary confinement with
mental-health issues often find those issues severely exacerbated.”); Haney, supra note
28, at 142 (“[P]risoners with preexisting mental illnesses are at greater risk of having
this suffering deepen into something more permanent and disabling.”) (emphasis added).
137
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10 days, where participants were unable to terminate their isolation at
will, that failed to result in negative psychological effects.”142
Second, there are simply far too many inmates in our correctional
facilities suffering from mental illnesses, such that relying on solitary
confinement is impractical and even worsens the problems it seeks to
resolve.143 As of 2015, there were ten times more people with mental
illnesses in correctional facilities than mental health treatment
facilities.144 Other estimates have claimed that as much as a third of the
country’s prison population suffers from mental health issues.145
Between 2017 and 2018, data self-reported by thirty-three states
showed that a median of 7.9% of the male custodial population was in
restrictive housing and suffering from serious mental illness.146 Three
states reported less than 1%, and two reported 0% of their male
custodial population as having a serious mental illness and being held
in restrictive housing.147 But, thirteen states reported double digits, and
New Mexico reported that 63.9% of their seriously mentally ill male
custodial population was in restrictive housing.148
The third issue with using solitary confinement as a tool for
managing the mentally ill is that symptoms may drive the “disruptive
behavior” that lands them in solitary.149 These inmates, as a result of
142

Haney, supra note 28, at 132.
See Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08cv-01317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182974, at *41 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (“[Psychological]
pain produces suffering, and a delay in treating the condition complicates the condition,
can accelerate or intensify decompensation and can reduce the chances of a mentally ill
prisoner achieving or re-establishing an optimal level of functioning.”); Joyce Kosak,
Mental Health Treatment and Mistreatment in Prisons, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 389, 397–
98 (2005) (noting that when adequate mental health treatment is provided to prisons,
there is a notable improvement in safety as evidenced by a reduction in the number of
violent disciplinary infractions, which are typically disproportionately high for inmates
with a mental illness as a result of inadequate treatment).
144 Darrell Steinberg & David Mills, When Did Prisons Become Acceptable Mental
Healthcare Facilities?, STANFORD L. SCH. THREE STRIKES PROJECT, 2 (Feb. 19, 2015),
https://law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/863745/doc/slspublic/Report_v12.p
df.
145 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCALIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 46 (Oct. 2018) (citing JENNIFER BRONSON &
MARCUS BERZOFKSY, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY
PRISONERS
AND
JAIL
INMATES,
2011–12,
NCJ
250612
(June
2017),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/imhprpji1112.pdf).
146 Id. at 48.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Ghafar, supra note 65, at 544 (discussing how “step-down” prison programs that
allow inmates to exit solitary confinement by incentivizing “good behavior” is
troublesome for mentally ill inmates because “[i]n a circular fashion, the extreme social
143
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their psychological conditions, often have difficulty conforming to the
hyper-regulated environment of prison.150 As a result, prison staff often
“treat disordered behaviors as disorderly behavior.”151 One of the most
salient examples of this was an inmate in Tamms Correctional Center,
Illinois, who received a sentence of one year in solitary confinement
after cutting his arm open with glass and eating his flesh.152 In cases
such as this, an inmate’s symptoms or claims of mental illness may be
portrayed as manipulation or malingering.153 This is a blatant and
disturbing mischaracterization, as such behavior is often consistent
with symptoms of mental illness, and many cases demonstrate inmates
“inflicting self-harm to escape their cell, even if just for a trip to
medical.”154 The cases are gruesome, including incidents such as an
inmate attempting to relieve an anxiety attack by stabbing paper clips
into his abdomen, and another “remov[ing] a screw from his light switch
cover and insert[ing] it into his penis just to get out of his cell.”155
Solitary confinement being the default solution for misbehavior (which
symptoms of untreated illness often cause) can perpetuate a destructive
cycle: disruptive behavior resulting from a mental illness placing an
inmate in solitary, which in turn has a dangerously high likelihood of
exacerbating the issue.156
and sensory deprivation of segregation in turn exacerbates those same symptoms that
have kept these inmates stuck at the bottom due to repeated disciplinary infractions.”).
150 Ghafar, supra note 65, at 545 n.156.
151 Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (2008).
152 ABRAMSKY, supra note 139, at 174 (“Inmate appeared before the committee to
address the charges. Inmate stated: I’m guilty. I was hungry and I was eating my arm
that day. . . . Disciplinary action: Segregation one year.”).
153 Compare Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, Illinois Prisoner Says Years of Solitary
Confinement Caused Mental Illness, Self‐Mutilation, SOLITARY WATCH (Sept. 2, 2011),
https://solitarywatch.org/2011/09/02/illinois-inmate-claims-years-of-solitaryconfinement-have-led-to-mental-illness-and-self-mutilation/ (claiming that Anthony
Gay’s seven-year isolation included routine self-mutilation, including an incident in
which he cut off one of his testicles and hung it from a string on his cell door), with People
v. Gay, 2011 IL App (4th) 100009, ¶ 28 (affirming trial court dismissal of defendant’s
amended postconviction petition and rejected defendant’s argument that “an offender
whose mental illness falls short of criminal insanity is less culpable than other offenders
generally.”).
154 Dillon, supra note 23, at 278.
155 ABRAMSKY, supra note 139, at 145; Christine Rebman, The Eighth Amendment and
Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection From Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL
L. REV. 567, 573-74 (1999) (citing Memorandum Compiling Inmate Letters from the
MacArthur Justice Center and the Institute for Community Law to the Coalition of Lawyers
and Members of Public Interest Community Concerned About Tamms Correctional Center,
3-5 (July 13, 1998) (on file with author)).
156 See ABRAMSKY, supra note 139, at 62 (“For the person with mental illness who
accumulates misconduct reports, ‘the pattern of custodial routine is an original demand
for compliance, and subsequent deprivation and punishment reinforce the original
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The governing standards for both placement into solitary
confinement and removal therefrom are often arbitrary and
discretionary.157 Navigating the rules of prison life is difficult for all
inmates, let alone those with mental illness, because it is rarely clear
what the expectations for inmate behavior actually are.158 Such
ambiguity, coupled with insufficient training of prison staff to recognize
and treat inmates with mental illness, has led to a disproportionate
amount of mentally ill inmates in solitary.159
3. No Available Alternatives: Why Other Avenues of Reform
Are Insufficient
The argument for abolition is strengthened by the lack of available
alternatives to pursue reform of solitary confinement.
i. Judicial Reform
Lawsuits against prison officials and administrations have become
a common avenue of redress from solitary confinement. The Supreme
Court has heard solitary confinement cases over the years, extending
significant legal protections to prisoners and expressing its concerns
about the effects of solitary confinement.160
The Court first
acknowledged some of the horrors of solitary confinement in In re
Medley161 and reasoned that it was an “additional punishment” to an
demand, which intensifies the problems by imposing more pressures upon already
existing pressures without providing any solution to the original problem.’”) (emphasis
added).
157 See Ghafar, supra note 65, at 512 (discussing how scholarship on solitary
confinement often focuses on “mental health consequences and the arbitrary reasons
and inconsistent processes determining how prisoners are sentenced to this
confinement”); Mariam Hinds & John Butler, Solitary Confinement: Can Courts Get
Inmates Out of the Hole? 11 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 331, 363 (June 2015) (discussing a mental
health and substance abuse task force that was sent to assess the Maine Department of
Corrections “[e]xpress[ed] concern with ‘the amount of discretion exercised by
corrections officers in sending prisoners to’ solitary confinement”).
158 See Ghafar, supra note 65, at 530 (finding that such arbitrary standards were used
by a majority of the ten states’ Departments of Corrections, including Georgia, Michigan,
Arizona, and Ohio).
159 Hafemeister & George, supra note 5, at 46.
160 Daniel H. Goldman & Ryan Brimmer, U.S. Supreme Court Cases, SOLITARY WATCH,
https://solitarywatch.org/resources/u-s-supreme-court-cases/ (last visited Jan. 17,
2020).
161 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168, 171 (1890) (“A considerable number of the
prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition . . . and
others became violently insane; others, still, committed suicide; while those who stood
the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.”) (“[T]he
solitary confinement to which the prisoner was subjected by the statute of Colorado of
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inmate’s sentence, amounting to an unconstitutional ex post facto
punishment. Thus, as early as 1890, this country’s judicial system
assessed the legality and harms of solitary confinement. Members of the
Court have continued to echo the concerns stated in In re Medley
regarding solitary confinement’s legality in light of its harmful effects.162
Yet, almost inexplicably, the Court has declined to declare the practice
per se unconstitutional, and has also denied certiorari for several
contemporary solitary confinement cases.163
ii. Administrative Reform
Another more common, but ineffective, avenue used to address
solitary confinement has been “administrative” changes, such as minor
reforms and policy changes made by the state legislature or by their
Department of Corrections. Such changes suggest that this country is
moving in the right direction and that the severe, inhumane effects of
solitary confinement are becoming more widely condemned. But, while
these are important policies, they are largely insufficient. In essence,
administrative changes tend to act as an attempt to merely put a bandaid on the issue.
Administrative reforms to solitary confinement swept the country
in 2014, dubbing it “the biggest year for reform.”164 These reforms
ranged from mere recommendations to pledges by Departments of
Corrections to reduce the use of solitary confinement to a complete ban
on the use of solitary for certain groups.165 While these reforms are
beneficial and, again, suggest that the reliance on solitary confinement
is on the decline, they have not generated lasting results in most states.
New York is one of the most illustrative examples. As one of the states
that notably ended juvenile solitary confinement, New York soon
1889 . . . was an additional punishment of the most important and painful character, and
is, therefore, forbidden by this provision of the Constitution.”) (emphasis added).
162 See e.g., Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 5, 10 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of cert.) (“Courts and corrections
officials must accordingly remain alert to the clear constitutional problems raised by
keeping [petitioners] in ‘near-total isolation’ from the living world, in what comes
perilously close to a penal tomb.”) (internal citations omitted).
163 See Apodaca, 139 S. Ct. at 10; Ruiz v. Texas, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1246 (2017);
Smith v. Ryan, 823 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 1283 (2017); Ayala
v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 2014); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015),
rehearing denied, 136 S. Ct. 14 (2015).
164 Hager, supra note 7.
165 Hager, supra note 7 (noting that a Nebraska legislative commission made sixteen
recommendations to the state Corrections Department); Hager, supra note 7 (reporting
that the New Mexico Corrections Department committed to reducing its reliance on
solitary confinement); Hager, supra note 7 (finding that as of February 19, 2014, New
York banned juvenile solitary confinement for disciplinary reasons).
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heeded advocacy for further restrictions.166 The Humane Alternatives
to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (“HALT”) was introduced to the
New York Legislature on January 15, 2019, and contained sweeping
reforms to solitary confinement, such as suicide prevention and other
mental health screening and removal provisions.167 Additionally, it
defined solitary confinement as any segregation for more than
seventeen hours—the lowest limit proposed by a state legislature yet.168
Over the next few months, it appeared that there was enough support
for passage in both houses of the state legislature.169 By mid-June,
however, the bill fell short of enactment.170 Despite this failure to pass
the bill, Governor Cuomo and other lawmakers insisted that the
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”)
enact administrative policies.171 The new rules included bans on
solitary confinement against populations such as pregnant women and
inmates with mental or physical disabilities, as well as new training
requirements and prohibitions against punitive diet restrictions.172
Perhaps most notably, the DOCCS rules will begin to phase in a thirtyday limit on the use of solitary confinement over the next three years; a
ninety-day cap will be effective in October 2021 and a sixty-day cap by
April 2022, until the thirty-day cap goes into effect on October 1,
2022.173
Since the passage of these rules, reports claim that they (including
the ban on juvenile solitary confinement) quickly fell to the wayside in
correctional facilities across the state.174 Correctional facilities in New
York have banned and restricted “solitary confinement” in name only,
and instead now utilize two common replacements: “keeplock
166

N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 97.
The Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (“HALT”), S.B.
1623, 2019-2020 N.Y. Legislative Sess. (2019)
168 Id.
169 Dennis Slattery, Breaking: HALT Bill Ending Solitary Confinement Gains Enough
Support to Pass NYS Senate, N.Y. ASSOC. OF PSYCHIATRIC REHAB. SERV., (Mar. 22, 2019),
https://www.nyaprs.org/e-news-bulletins/2019/3/22/breaking-halt-bill-endingsolitary-confinement-gains-enough-support-to-pass-nys-senate.
170 Clark, supra note 107.
171 Clark, supra note 107.
172 Clark, supra note 107.
173 Clark, supra note 107.
174 See Jake Offenhartz, “Separation Status” Now Replacing Solitary Confinement For
Teens
on
Rikers,
Attorneys
Say,
GOTHAMIST
(Aug.
23,
2019),
https://gothamist.com/news/separation-status-now-replacing-solitary-confinementfor-teens-on-rikers-attorneys-say; Andrea Cipriano, Solitary Confinement Increases in
New
York
State:
Report,
CRIME
REPORT
(Oct.
29,
2019),
https://thecrimereport.org/2019/10/29/solitary-confinement-increases-in-newyork-state-report/.
167
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sanctions” and “separation housing status.”175 Inmate transfers to local
and county jails that do not restrict solitary confinement use is another
reported workaround to the restrictions.176
Other states have followed similar trajectories as New York. After
a 2011 Washington Post report found Virginia prisons held one in
twenty prisoners in solitary confinement—including 500 of the 750
prisoners at Supermax Red Onion State Prison—the Virginia
Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) implemented the “Segregation
Reduction Step-Down Plan.”177 The 2016 Department of Justice
Restrictive Housing report included VDOC’s efforts as an example for
how to provide “a path for inmates in long-term administrative
segregation to work their way into the general population.”178 While the
Step-Down Plan created some improvements in Virginia correctional
facilities, there remains serious concern both about the long-term
effectiveness of the Plan and the lack of additional reform since 2011.179
Most notably, reports explain that despite the Step-Down Plan’s thirtyday limit on disciplinary solitary confinement, inmates still face
indefinite periods of isolation.180 Further, inmates continue to report
horrifying instances of abuse and mistreatment by correctional
employees.181

175 Offenhartz, supra note 174 (noting that “separation housing status” is particularly
troublesome because there are no apparent placement restrictions based on inmates
age, mental health, or medical status, nor is there a definitive end period). See also
Cipriano, supra note 174 (discussing New York’s “keeplock sanctions”).
176 See Ashley Southall & Jan Ransom, New York City’s Young Inmates Are Held in
Isolation
Upstate,
Despite
Ban,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
22,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/nyregion/inmate-solitary-young-nyc.html
(noting that transfers of inmates under the age of 21 sharply increased starting in 2015,
the year after the juvenile ban was effected); Taylor Elizabeth Eldridge, Rikers Doesn’t
Put Teens in Solitary. Other New York Jails Do., MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/03/28/rikers-doesn-t-put-teens-insolitary-other-new-york-jails-do.
177 GASPAROTTO, supra note 12, at 24-25.
178 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 77.
179 GASPAROTTO, supra note 12, at 29.
180 GASPAROTTO, supra note 12, at 32.
181 Editorial, Horrifying Reports From Solitary Confinement Prove Virginia Still Has Far
to
Go,
WASH.
POST.
(June
3,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/horrifying-reports-from-solitaryconfinement-prove-virginia-still-has-far-to-go/2018/06/03/c7da6df0-6532-11e899d2-0d678ec08c2f_story.html (“[Reports suggest] that the spirit of reform has not
permeated the state’s Department of Corrections . . . One [solitary inmate] ‘stated that
he has not had recreation or a shower in more than a month.’ Another ‘reported that his
food tray slot was opened and he was sprayed in his face with a can of mace’ . . . The
prisoner was told if he reported the incident they would ‘beat my ***** ass.’”).
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V. CONCLUSION
The ills of solitary confinement are widely known, and research
confirms the use of solitary confinement comes with severe
consequences to its victims. Yet almost inexplicably, correctional
facilities across the country continue to rely on solitary confinement.
Moreover, the judicial system demonstrates an open unwillingness to
address the per se constitutionality of the practice, and Departments of
Corrections around the country demonstrate how solitary confinement
can be abused.182 Perhaps more distressing is the failure of state
legislatures to abolish solitary confinement. Instead, states pass
piecemeal laws that merely tinker with the practice and application
within correctional facilities: New Jersey’s Isolated Confinement
Restriction Act provides the perfect example. Aside from emergency
situations, such as a facility-wide lockdown or a quarantine situation,
facilities should not use solitary confinement as either a punishment or
a management tool. The toll solitary confinement exacts on inmates is
far too great to justify its continued use.

182 See ASS’N OF ST. CORR. ADM’RS & LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE
HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 68 (Oct. 2018).

